Change Launch on Warning Policy
by Alan Phillips and Steven Starr
A PDF version of the article is available here.
The "times" in the following table assume a flight time of about 30 minutes, i.e. that of ICBM's between Russia and USA. We do not know whether LoW is in effect in either country for a warning of a short-range SLBM attack. If it is in effect, then the sequence up to the moment of 'authorization' must be greatly compressed, with the time available for conferences much reduced. There is little scope for reducing the duration of the steps from then on, but the comparison between the LoW sequence and the RLOAD sequence is unchanged. The rest of this paper does not specifically address the case of a perceived short-range attack by offshore SLBM's. The argument for changing to RLOAD would, we believe, be essentially unchanged.
Replace LoW with Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation (RLOAD)
AS LONG AS THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA retain their arsenals of nuclear-armed intercontinental
One of the most likely causes of an unintended nuclear war is "Launch on Warning" (LoW) – the policy of launching a retaliatory nuclear strike while the opponent's missiles or warheads are believed to be in flight, but
The danger inherent in this policy has been appreciated by all concerned since it was first considered in the early 1960's2. Priority has been given to reducing this risk, in UN Resolutions and in recommendations from prestigious bodies including the Canberra Commission, the Brookings Institution, and the Center for Defense Information. They have frequently called for "lowering the alert status" or similar phrases, without distinguishing that from simply changing the policy of "Launch on Warning".
The disaster of an accidental nuclear war has not happened yet, in spite of a large number of false warnings of which at least a few have had very dangerous features. This is a credit to the care and alertness of the military in both Russia and the U.S. It should not be taken as reassurance. A "retaliatory" launch of nuclear weapons on a false warning would result in nuclear war, and the end of civilization as we know it, just as surely as a nuclear war started by an actual attack. There would be no chance to review the system to make it safer after one failure of that kind.
Although the Cold War is considered over, both Russia and the United States have chosen to retain their LoW capabilities, and they are generally believed to be continuing their LoW policies. If this is the case, it is inexcusably dangerous.
Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation (RLOAD)
The policy of LoW should be replaced by one of "Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation" (RLOAD).
Adoption of an RLOAD policy by both parties would, at a stroke, remove the danger of an accidental war caused by a false warning, simply because after a false warning there would be no nuclear detonation and no "retaliatory" launch would take place.
The "threat conference"3
When warning systems detect a possible ICBM attack, there is at most a total of 20 minutes for human operators and commanders to call and conduct a threat conference. If the warning were to be assessed as a nuclear attack, top U.S. or Russian military commanders (as the case might be) would contact their president to advise him, and the president would have only a few minutes to decide whether to retaliate. We believe he would be under great pressure to do so.4 The threat conferences require, and so far have achieved, the extraordinary standard of perfect accuracy.
It is clear that threat conferences have not been rare events.5 The US government has kept information about false warnings classified since 1985, and Russia has always kept that information secret. Most of the false warnings have probably been routine and easy to dismiss; some in the US have been serious enough that launch preparations have been started which would have been visible to Russian satellites.6 On the Russian side, we know of a 1983 event in which an officer decided, against standing orders, not to pass on a high-level warning because he judged, correctly, that it was false7; and in January 1995 a false warning resulted from the launch of a rocket from a Norwegian island, for atmospheric research. It is reported that in the 1995 event the Russian nuclear weapon forces went on full alert, and President Yeltsin was holding the activated nuclear briefcase with only a few minutes to decision time. The episode was the subject of a report to U.S. Congress. There is an article on it by experts von Hippel, Blair, and Feiveson, in Scientific American.8
It is very dangerous to allow a small risk of a great disaster to continue for a long time. To illustrate this, suppose that the risk of a wrong conclusion from just one of the many conferences in a year had been only 1% per year, then it is easy to calculate that the cumulative risk over 30 years would have been close to one in six – the risk of death from one pull of the trigger at Russian roulette. If it had been 2% per year the probability of surviving those 30 years would have been close to 50:50.9
It is essential to eliminate as soon as possible the risk of instant destruction of both these great countries, and the whole of our civilization, by a mere accident. RLOAD can be put into effect by executive decision and relatively small changes in standing orders and items such as re-routing the signals from the detonation detectors. To change from LoW to RLOAD does not reduce the alert status or readiness of the nuclear force. It only removes the risk of responding to a false warning.
RLOAD does not need verification
The proposed change would not require symmetry, nor verification, nor an agreement (much less a treaty); nor would it undermine deterrence. RLOAD could be adopted quickly and unilaterally. If one side adopted it, the risk of accidental war would be immediately reduced by approximately one half. When the other side did the same the risk of war caused by a false warning would be zero
From the point of view of preserving deterrence, verification of RLOAD is actually undesirable. If either side planning a preemptive attack had the idea that RLOAD would make the targetted nation vulnerable to a first strike, it would need to be certain that its opponent had changed to and remained under the policy of RLOAD. Without verification a potential attacker could not be certain, but if RLOAD were verified he might think there was a possibility of making a successful first strike, though we argue below that this would be irrational.
A change from LoW to RLOAD would not eliminate any other retaliatory options (such as, for example, a decision how to react to an unauthorized launch or to a single rocket). It would merely ensure that retaliation to a perceived attack would not take place unless there had been a nuclear detonation. It would delay the retaliatory strike by only a few minutes. But if the warning were false (as all the warnings of nuclear attack have been up to the present) that fact would be immediately revealed as soon as the predicted time had passed for the first missiles to arrive and no detonation had been detected; and there would be no launch.
De-alerting compared with RLOAD
"De-alerting" is a term commonly used in recommendations that nuclear weapons should be "taken off hairtrigger alert". What is usually meant by de-alerting is to make physical changes to the weapons system which impose a delay between a decision to launch and the irrevocable step that actually starts the launch. Separating the warheads from the rockets and storing them at a distance, or doing the same with any essential component, would be sure methods of introducing delay, and several others have been suggested. Obviously any unavoidable delay of that kind would make an LoW policy impossible. As well as eliminating the risk of launch on a false warning, dealerting would give other benefits such as reducing the risk of unauthorized launch, but it would be difficult to implement.
To change from LoW to RLOAD does not reduce the alert status or readiness of the nuclear force. It only removes the risk of responding to a false warning. Unfortunately, when giving up LoW has been recommended it has not been clearly distinguished from de-alerting. De-alerting needs symmetry and verification if the current requirements for deterrence are to be maintained. Simply abandoning LoW would also remove the risk of responding to a false warning. But to change from LoW to RLOAD maintains deterrence while not requiring symmetry.
On any rational view, it is essential to eliminate as soon as possible the risk of instant destruction of both these great countries, and the whole of our civilization, by a mere accident. De-alerting would take a long time to put into practice; RLOAD can be put into effect by executive decision and relatively small changes in standing orders and items such as re-routing the signals from the detonation detectors.
Barring a profound change in international relations, there seems to be no prospect of the US and Russian governments giving up nuclear deterrence in the near future. It would be difficult to frame a de-alerting plan that retains the essentials of deterrence. The enforced delays would have to be equal for the two adversaries, for all their types of long-range missiles including those in submarines. The actual delay times would have to be verifiable, and continually verified either by international observers or by observers from the opposite side. At the least, de-alerting would require extensive study by experts, followed by a formal agreement or treaty. The process would take years, and perhaps end in failure. All that time, the world would still be at risk of an accidental war started by a false warning.
In contrast, RLOAD is compatible with deterrence, as explained below, and is relatively easy to achieve. The change from LoW to RLOAD would not eliminate any other retaliatory options (such as, for example, a decision how to react to an unauthorized launch or to a single rocket). It would merely ensure that retaliation did not take place unless there had been a nuclear detonation. It would delay the retaliatory strike by only a few minutes. But if the warning were false (as all the warnings of nuclear attack have been up to the present) that fact would be immediately revealed as soon as the predicted time had passed for the first missiles to arrive and no detonation had been detected; and there would be no launch.
RLOAD is compatible with deterrence
The purpose of deterrence is to prevent either side from launching a nuclear attack. This is achieved by each side convincing the other that any attack will bring unacceptable retaliation. The theory of deterrence relies on the assumption that the ultimate decision-makers on both sides act rationally, and can be persuaded that it would be folly to launch an attack. Deterrence fails if one side believes it can launch such a rapid and massive surprise nuclear strike that it will prevent the other side from retaliating.
Launch on Warning is a response to the concern that the aggressor's first salvo, or a devastating electromagnetic pulse (EMP), might prevent or greatly weaken a retaliatory strike. The military on both sides have planned as though it would be essential for retaliation to be achieved after a first strike was actually launched. That is not so. Retaliation does nothing to stop the warheads that are already on the way to their targets, nor the second salvo which the aggressor may launch when he sees retaliatory warheads on their way. Once an attack has been launched irreparable damage to the attacked country is already inevitable10. Retaliation is not planned for revenge, but for deterrence. Deterrence is achieved if the potential attacker foresees an unacceptable risk that unacceptable retaliation would follow an attack. He would have to be certain, or almost certain, that his enemy's retaliation would fail, in order to risk making an attack. A mere chance that retaliation might fail would not impair deterrence.
The following considerations show that, as things are at present, neither side can be certain that retaliation would fail.
First, as regards an EMP attack, it is known to both sides that great efforts have been made to screen military electrical equipment from the pulse.11 Therefore it is not possible to be sure that EMP will be effective against land-based missiles. Submerged submarines and the missiles they carry are known to be completely protected by sea water.12
Change LoW Policy, p.6
Neither can an attacker be sure that a "disarming first strike" will be successful, as the following discussion will show.
The United States uses the space-based Nuclear Detonation Detection System (NUDET) to detect, locate, and report to the Strategic Command Centers, any nuclear explosion in the Earth's atmosphere or nearby space. NUDET either supplements or replaces the hundreds of ground-based "bomb alarms" that were installed near military bases and big cities in 1974.13
Russia employs optical and seismic sensors to detect nuclear explosions.14 Their policy is believed to be Launch on Warning, which, as in the US system, would only be ordered by the National Command Authority. They have a back-up system called "Perimetr" to ensure retaliation in the event of an attack that has disabled the National Command Authority before it can order the retaliatory launch. Positive signals from the detonation detectors are a prerequisite to any launch ordered via the Perimetr system, which therefore cannot effect a "Launch on Warning".
A change from Launch on Warning to RLOAD would require, in the American system, feeding any positive signals from the detonation detectors directly to the launch crews as well as to the command centers, so that destruction of command centers would not prevent a retaliatory strike. Retaliation would be ensured (if already authorized) immediately upon a detonation, by having the launch crews carry out all steps toward launch except the final one, during the flight of incoming missiles, just as they do under LoW. On receipt of a detonation signal at the predicted time of arrival of attack retaliation would be launched immediately by all launch crews, except any who were already casualties. If no detonation was detected at the predicted time of arrival, the crews would revert to peacetime readiness.
In the Russian system, as far as we know, similar changes would be required.
The retaliatory launch, we presume, is 'countervalue' in order to have the greatest deterrent effect. Less than 5% of the 1,250 warheads at LoW readiness should be enough to inflict "unacceptable" damage, on any reasonable criteria. No head of state or commander-in-chief could be certain that an initial salvo could put more than 95 percent of these weapons out of action within a few seconds of the first detonation. Thus a massive disarming first strike could not in fact be relied upon to prevent unacceptable retaliation.
These arguments should be sufficient to persuade the military on both sides that the policy of LoW, which they know to be dangerous, is not essential and should be replaced by RLOAD – Retaliatory Launch Only After Detonation. If the military establishment on either side is not persuaded to abandon LoW, then the head of state must balance the elimination of a very definite risk of accidental war due to a false warning, against the hypothetical possibility of the enemy launching a first strike because he judged that RLOAD had weakened deterrence.
There is no logical reason to maintain Launch on Warning. It is to the equal advantage of both sides even if only one changes its policy to RLOAD, and if both adopt RLOAD then one of the most likely causes of an unintended nuclear war between Russia and the U.S. – an accidental war due to a false warning – will be eliminated.
EMP: Electromagnetic Pulse
My friend and teacher, Dr. Alan Phillips was a retired physicist and physician who did radar research for the British army during World War II. He recently passed away and is greatly missed. Physicians for Global Survival-Canada have a beautiful tribute to his memory at http://pgs.ca/?page_id=556
Steven Starr trained in nuclear engineering, but changed to a career in medical technology, and now works as a freelance writer on nuclear weapons issues. He lives in Columbia, Missouri.
Comments or questions to: [email protected]
“Change Launch on Warning Policy” is available online at the website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, see http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/
1. Launch on Warning and the related term "Launch under Attack" (LUA) are not always used consistently, and this has caused confusion. In the US Defense Department Dictionary of Military Terms (www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ ), LUA has a definition exactly the equivalent of our use of LoW. Russian military experts (writing in English) use LUA to mean the delivery of a retaliatory nuclear strike "in response to an actually delivered strike", i.e. after nuclear detonations have been confirmed (see Valery Yarynich, C3: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation, Washington, D.C.: Center for Defense Information, 2003, pp. 28 -30.) Also, a retired British military officer explained that "launch on warning" can mean to him the launch of a preemptive strike when there is convincing evidence from human sources that an enemy nuclear attack is imminent, but no enemy missiles have yet been launched.